Category: Hex

Countering Capenhurst – March 2022

URENCO at 52

On March 4th it was 52 years since the founding of URENCO with Treaty of Almelo.

Aside from rereading out previous statements about our opossition to URENCO we read out the following new one from Radiation Free Lakeland

‘ Radiation Free Lakeland stand in solidarity with Close Capenhurst and would like to thank the Close Capenhurst campaigners for representing all of us who are impacted by the nuclear waste industry from its obscene beginnings in uranium mining to its ‘dangerous to all life on earth’ end product which is long lived nuclear wastes. We have long been concerned about the exports of Uranium Hexafluoride from URENCO Capenhurst (and Springfields) to Russia and other countries, one mans nuclear waste is another mans nuclear weapon.

In Cumbria we are being asked to “look again” at the dumping of High Level Nuclear wastes in our flawed and complex geology – this time even the subsea area is on the table including the Irish Sea area either side of the controversial coal mine plan.

Incredibly the coal mine boss Mark Kirkbride is giving the UK government advice on costings – not only on the digging of very deep holes for Geological Disposal of High level Nuclear wastes but also on the digging of not so deep holes for Near Surface Disposal of Intermediate Level Nuclear Wastes.

We have set up a new campaign to fight these plans called Lakes Against Nuclear Dump and we are calling for the dumping of nuclear wastes to cease – everywhere! The first step is to Just Stop Nuclear.’

Check out Lakes Against Nuclear Dump

URENCO Uranium to Russia.

The following is a press release from Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg in Germany.

Gronauer Uran in umkämpften Ukraine-AKW?

Uranium waste export from UK to Russia stopped?

A few days ago – still after the beginning of the war – Urenco wanted to use the Russian nuclear freighter “Mikhail Dudin” to bring depleted uranium waste from the British uranium enrichment plant Capenhurst to Russia for final storage. The deal apparently fell through at the last minute after protests from Germany and the Netherlands. A Dutch Urenco spokeswoman told the newspaper Tubantia that Urenco would “of course” comply with EU, UK and US sanctions. But does this about-face also apply to uranium waste transports from Gronau to Russia?

Uranium enriched in Gronau in Münsterland is probably also being used in the fiercely contested nuclear power plants in Ukraine. This is the fear of anti-nuclear initiatives, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate IPPNW and the Federal Association of Citizens’ Initiatives for Environmental Protection (BBU). They therefore demand that the German government immediately stop the delivery of uranium from Gronau and of fuel elements from Lingen to Russia and Ukraine. This also means a binding end to uranium waste exports from Gronau to Russia.

For several years, the German-Dutch-British uranium enricher Urenco has been Ukraine’s main supplier of enriched uranium. This is then processed into fuel elements by the US company Westinghouse in Västeras, Sweden, from where it is exported to Ukraine. According to the export list of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, the most recent export licences for enriched uranium from Gronau to the Swedish fuel element factory were issued on 1 February 2022 and 2 December 2021.

The transports from Gronau to Russia were stopped for a couple of years, but take place constantly nowadays.

Civil Nukiller Police

During Febuary American Soldiers from their Nuclear Disablement Team 2 (NDT 2) toured the CNC Griffin Park Tactical Training Centre at Sellafield during a recent visit

New Exports Of Depleted Hex To Russia

URENCO are about to start exporting more Depleted Uranium Hex.

This is from their Gronau plant to Russia.

It might be noted how previous exports of Depleted Uranium Hex to Russia has been critised by WISE as cheap way of URENCO dumping this nukiller waste.

The new contract is for 6,000 tons of Depeleted UF6.

In a second part of this deal another 6000 ton will be exported to Russia between now and 2022. Press reports in Gemany state that URENCO have said that no decision has been made about if this will be exported from Almelo in the Netherlands, or from Capenhurst.

If anyone has any more information on this issue then please let us. know.

The Last Used Highly Radioactive Fuel Rods Sent From Wylfra To Sellafield.

Close Capenhurst Campaign Statement

Concerning the last radioactive fuel rods transported by rail from Wylfra.

While we welcome the end of highly radioactive used fuel rods being transported from Wylfra via Chester and Crewe to Sellafield.

We are still concerned about all the other nukiller fuel rods which are transported by DRS [Direct Rail Services ] to Sellafield via nearby Crewe.

We will continue to campaign upon this issue, together with the movement of Uranium Hexafluoride [ Hex ] to and from Capenhurst by road.

While continuing to support the demand of PAWB – People Against Wylfa-B that No New Atomic Power Plant be built on Anglesey .

Counting The Cost – The New Capenhurst Tailings Plant.

The new tailings plant at Capenhurst raises more concerns.

Time and Materials.

The new Capenhurst tailing plant took an extra four years to complete than URENCO originally intended it to be. That is two years longer than the previous two years delay on the planned opening of the plant.

The plant is built of 55,000 cubic meters of concrete and 7,300 tonnes of steel.

At the official opening of the plant it was stated how that’s enough concrete to fill twenty Olympic sized swimming pools.

What was not stated is how the use of so much concrete impacts upon climate change.

In to the future.

URENCO have previously stated that the new tailing plant will be in operation until 2052.

Yet given the nukiller industries previous record of dragging work on, together with the four years delay in building the plant, we regard the 2052 date as no more than a guestimation.

From Germany and the Netherlands.

The Capenhurst plant will be processing Depleted Uranium Hex from the site, together with that from the URENCO plants in German and the Netherlands.

Given that we don’t know how much depleted hex is stored at Capenhurst, never mind the two other plants, we have no idea just what quantity of Hex will be processed. That says nothing about any more depleted depleted uranium Hex which might be created in the years to come.

By Sea

URENCO plan to ship over the depleted Uranium Hex from their plants in Germany and the Netherlands, and then ship back the resulting the Uranium Oxide to those plants.

Given that there is a prohibition on moving Hex through the Channel and other tunnels, all of this hex will need to be transported by road and sea.

There is no rail connection at the Capenhurst plant.

Thus we are looking to face the danger of Hex being moved that way for the next 35 years.

Telling the Real Tail About Tailings

A New Plant at Capenhurst.

Having spent almost One Billion pounds, and over four years late to complete, the new URENCO tailings plant at Capenhurst is opening this month.

The plant will convert the highly dangerous Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride [ Hex ] stored at the plant in to Uranium Oxide.

Depleted Uranium Hex is a highly toxic radioactive substance, which is corrosive to most metals, and should never be exposed to water.

It is estimated that the new plant will operate until 2052.

Past Mistakes

The depleted Uranium Hex at the Capenhurst plant was created as a part of the Uranium enrichment process, which is still being used to create more nukiller fuel rods.

In turn these fuel rods becomes highly radioactive nukiller waste, which adds to the existing radioactive problems at both Sellafield and Drigg.

There is just no need to produce energy this way.

Future Mistakes.

While the Capenhurst URENCO uranium enrichment plant is still in operation, it will continue contributing towards the making of yet more nukiller fuel, and thus much more highly radioactive waste.

Our continuing Demand.

We call for the closure of all uranium enrichment plants, and an end to the nukiller power industry.

Countering Capenhurst – Our Hex and Export Concerns

This is a special issue of Countering Capenhurst.

Finding out just what goes on at Capenhurst is very difficult to do, and the same applies to all of the URENCO plants.

What follows is just a summary of what we have managed to find out about the plant of late, and something about which countries URENCO has been trading with.

A question of Hex

We continue to keep asking about just what is going on at Capenhurst, with questions such as:-

How much depleted Uranium Hexafluoride is stored at Capenhurst?

&

What is the state of the Uranium Hex containers ?

Yet there is an aspect of this which very few people have ever heard about.

There is a clue to it within the following  Review by HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate.

Urenco (Capenhurst) Ltd’s strategy for decommissioning its nuclear licensed site.

 ‘UCL has an ongoing contract, up for renewal in 2007, with Technabexport of Russia, which takes ex UCL tails cylinders and re-enriches the material to low enrichment product and/or pseudo natural. The product is sold on and the pseudo natural is re-fed or sold on. The operation of this contract is maintaining a steady state of net tails stocks on Capenhurst site.’

That’s something which URENCO has kept very quiet about.

Shipping information

We recently came upon a German  BREMISCHE BÜRGERSCHAFT report which listed the movement of uranium through the port of Bremin.

This included uranium being sent from Urenco to Russia.

Two of the latest of these reports are

Atomtransporte durch das Land Bremen seit dem 30. Juni 2014

&

Atomtransporte durch das Land Bremen seit dem 30. Juni 2013

The importance of these reports is that they give some clues as to just which companies and countries URENCO is traiding with.

Europe’s radioactive secret

Then we came upon the following report which was published in 2005,  and which has not been followed up on.

Europe’s radioactive secret.

How EDF and European nuclear utilities are dumping nuclear waste in the Russian Federation

‘ This report summarises the secretive attempts of the European nuclear industry to ‘solve’ one of their largest waste problems, by exporting and dumping tens of thousands of tonnes of uranium wastes in Siberia, in the Russian Federation.’

This last document is very worrying indeed.

The Re-enrichment of West European Depleted Uranium Tails in Russia

The information contained in this document are very technical in nature.

So rather than give an analysis of what is in this document we will just give the following summary from this report.

‘ Since 1996, depleted uranium tails from West European enrichers Urenco and Eurodif are being sent to Russia for re-enrichment. In Russia, the imported tails are, instead of natural uranium, fed into surplus enrichment cascades. The product obtained from re-enrichment is mostly natural-equivalent uranium plus some reactor-grade low-enriched uranium.

These products are sent back to Urenco and Eurodif, while the secondary tails generated remain in Russia,where they are re-enriched further to obtain morenatural-equivalent uranium and/or slightly enriched uranium. The latter is then used as blendstock for the downblending of surplus highly-enriched weapons-grade uranium into reactor-grade low-enriched uranium. The ultimate tails left, still comprising at least two thirds of the amount imported, remain in Russia with unknown fate.’

&

‘Details on the re-enrichment business, though it is currently taking place at large scale, are hardly obtainable. In Russia, all related information is confidential; and, the West-European enrichment companies involved, Urenco and Eurodif, are not very communicative, to put it politely. In its recent annual reports, Urenco not even discloses its annual production figure, nor the capacity break down for its facilities, not to speak about other data of interest, such as amount and assays of tails produced.’

We will continue to keep searching for more information on these contacts.

How Much Depleted Hex Is At Capenhust ? ? ?

How Much Hex ?

Uranium Hexafluoride is highly toxic, radioactive, corrosive to most metals, and reacts violently with water.

One of the questions we have been asking since the Close Capenhurst Campaign was established is just how much Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride is stored at the URENCO Capenhurst site.

The best answer we have received is ‘ A vast Quantity’,which is also the only way we have been able to describe it.

We just don’t know.

Although one recent article stated that it is some 60,000 tonnes.

This is exactly what we want to know.

 

1. How many containers of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride are stored at the Capenhurst site ?

2. What is the total mass of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride which each of the containers at Capenhurst can hold ?

3. What is the total mass of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride which is stored at the Capenhurst site ?

&

4. How much of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride will the new tailing plant at Capenhurst be able to process each hour ?

We recently submitted these questions to the Office of Nuclear Regulation as a Freedom of Information request.

This is the response which we received from them: –

‘We receive updates (a month in arrears from relevant UK dutyholders) on the amounts of material held on sites that are under our Nuclear Safeguards regime. Whilst we hold some of the data you require, we unfortunately do not receive it in the format that you have requested – it would take a significant amount of time to interrogate the data, to extract the specific volume of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride and provide the information in the requested format, approximately 60 man hours at a cost of £900 over and above the £600 or 3 days’ effort that you are assigned under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

We cannot release the data set in its entirety as it contains Sensitive Nuclear Information, which would need to be redacted/extracted under section 24 of FOIA, National Security.’

In other words

They would only be willing to let us have the answer, if we were willing to give them £900.

This ‘fee’ will then be used to redact much of the information from any reply which we might receive.

Our response to this is as follows.

– 1. That what we asked for relates to a matter of very great public concern, and should be freely available to us all.

– 2. That we Do Not intend to pay out any money in order to maintain the secrecy which is an integral part of how the Nukiller Industry operates.

&

– 3. That we will continue to keep asking the same questions until we get the information which we require.